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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction for the Court of Appeals is conferred statutorily
by U.C.A. 77-35-26 and Rule 26 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
which gives the Utah Court of Appeals jurisdiction over appeals
from final judgments in the Seventh Judicial District Court.

STATEMENT OF TSCTIKSS

1.

The issue before the court is whether error was committed

by the District Court when it dismissed Petitioner's Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Relief based upon the
ninety day statute of limitations when there were extraordinary
circumstances which prohibited the Petitioner from filing his
petition within the ninety day statute of limitations.
Standard of Review:

Correctness of the trial court's

ruling, and no particular deference should be given to the court's
conclusion.
1990),

Henretty v. Manti City Corp.. 791 P.2d 506 (Utah

Scharf v.

B.M.G.

Corp., 700

P. 2d

1068

(Utah

1985),

Transamerica Cash Reserve v. Dixie Power, 789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990)#
and

Automotive Mfrs. , etc. v. Serv. Auto Parts, Inc. f 596 P.2d 1033

(Utah 1979).
2.

Whether the ninety day statute of limitations for filing

a Writ of Habeas Corpus is unconstitutional because it is a statute
of limitations and not a procedural limitation.

4

Standard of Review;

Correctness

of the trial court's

ruling, and no particular deference should be given to the court's
conclusion.
1990),

Henretty v. Manti City Corp.. 791 P.2d 506 (Utah

Scharf

v.

B.M.G.

Corp..

700 P.2d

1068

(Utah

1985),

Transamerica Cash Reserve v. Dixie Powerr 789 P. 2d 24 (Utah 1990),
and Automotive Mfrs. , etc. v. Serv. Auto Parts. Inc.. 596 P.2d 1033
(Utah 1979).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION. STATUTES
ORDINANCES AND RULES
Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4; (See Addendum E)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 65B(b); (See Addendum F)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 78-12-31.1, (See Addendum G)

STATEMENT OF CASE
The Appellant filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and
Post Conviction Relief on the 16th day of April, 1992. Assistant
Attorney General, David Bryant, filed a Motion To Dismiss and
Memorandum in Support of Motion To Dismiss the Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus on the 30th day of April, 1992.

The Motion To

Dismiss was based upon the ninety day statute of limitations set
forth in Utah Code Ann. 78-12-31.1, which bars any Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus not filed within a ninety day period from the
date that the cause of action accrued.
5

The Appellant filed a Motion For Extension of Time with the
District Court on the 19th day of May, 1992.

The District Court

granted said extension on the 28th day of May, 1992.
The Appellant filed an Objection and Request For Hearing on
the 5th day of June, 1992, wherein, he specifically stated why the
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Relief
should not be barred by the ninety day statute of limitations. The
Memorandum in Response to the Petitioner's Objection was filed on
the 10th day of June, 1992.
The District Court granted the Attorney General's Motion To
Dismiss on the 12th day of June, 1992, and the final Order was
entered therein on the 22nd day of June, 1992.

The Appellant's

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Relief was
based upon the theory of ineffective assistance of counsel at the
time of Petitioner's plea agreement in his criminal case and at the
time of sentencing.

The Appellant's Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus was also based upon an affidavit which he had obtained from
a co-defendant
Petitioner
prosecution.

and

who had been an adverse witness against the
for

the

state

in

his

associated

criminal

Said affidavit rescinded an incriminating statement

which had been previously made by said co-defendant.

6

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Petitioner was charged with a First Degree Felony in 1989. As
a result of wrongful and undue pressure on the part of Petitioner's
defense counsel, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement whereby
he plead guilty to a Second Degree Felony and another Misdemeanor
charge was dropped.

Subsequentlyf Petitioner brought two motions

to withdraw his guilty plea, during which his counsel admitted that
he had applied undue and wrongful pressure upon the Petitioner in
order to convince him to plead guilty.

The motions were denied.

An Appeal was filed on the denial of the motions to withdraw his
guilty plea.

However, Petitioner was convinced by his counsel to

withdraw the appeal based upon counsel's representing that if the
Petitioner dropped the appeal and refrained from any legal action
against his counsel, he would arrange for Petitioner's release from
a term of six months in the county jail that he was serving
pursuant to probation and suspended sentence. Petitioner was soon
thereafter released from the county jail and remained on probation
until such time as he tested positive for use of a controlled
substance and his probation was then revoked. A significant factor
in Petitioner's decision to plead guilty was the information that
a co-defendant

in the criminal matter had provided

damaging

testimony against the Petitioner.
On or about October 28, 1991, wherein, Mr. Marquez recanted
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the

damaging

testimony

he had

previously

given

against

the

Petitioner. About two weeks later Petitioner received an affidavit
which was signed by said co-defendant, Raymond Marquez. Petitioner
soon thereafter met with the contract attorneys at the Utah State
Prison to obtain assistance in filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus concerning the withdrawal of his guilty plea.

On December

16, 1991, the contract attorneys received from the Petitioner an
edited rough draft of his Habeas Corpus for revisions. Immediately
thereafter Mr. Currier was transferred to the San Juan County Jail.
On or about January 6, 1992, the contract attorneys received
from Mr. Currier a letter indicating that he had been transferred
to the County Jail and on that same date a memo and revised
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus along with the Petitioner's
transcripts were sent

to him

at the San Juan

County Jail.

nAccompanying said documents was a memo from the contract attorneys
that stated that since he had been transferred to the San Juan
County Jail, which was out of the contract attorneys jurisdiction,
they were unable to help him with anymore services and he was
advised to contact the contract attorney for that area.

Upon

arrival at the San Juan County Jail the Petitioner requested to see
the San Juan County Jail contract attorney, but was not able to see
him until approximately five weeks later.
On or about March 20, 1992, Mr. Currier was transferred back

8

to the Utah State Prison at which time he gave to the contract
attorneys his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and exhibits in
order to file them with the court. On March 25, 1992, the original
and

three

copies

of

Mr.

Currier's

Petition,

Exhibits

and

accompanying documents were sent to him at the Utah State Prison
for his signature and were subsequently filed on or about April 10,
1992.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

Utah's
ninety
day
statute
of
limitations
is
unconstitutional because ninety days is not a reasonable
period of time in which to file for relief.

II.

The ninety day statute of limitations is unconstitutional
because it is a statute of limitations and not a
procedural limitation.

III. Utah's statute of limitations is unconstitutional because
it contains no provision for excusable delay.

ARGUMENT
I
UTAH'S NINETY DAY STATUTE OP T.TMTTATIONS ON THE
FILING OF A WRIT HABEAS CORPUS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The

Petitioner

acknowledges

that

the

state

may

apply

procedural limitations on the filing of Petitions for Writs of
Habeas Corpus. However, the Petitioner contends that, in order for
that procedural

limitation to be Constitutional, it must be
9

reasonable and that a ninety day statute of limitations is not
reasonable. The Petitioner's only access to legal materials, while
at the prison, is through the contract attorneys.

Said contract

attorneys have a limited contract which only enables them to assist
nthe inmates in preparing their initial pleadings for Petitions for
Writs of Habeas Corpus.

Because the contract attorneys do not

actually represent the inmates, it is often required that the
inmate obtain his own documentation
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

in order to prepare the

In the Petitioner's case, he

had virtually no copies of any of his court file and consequently,
was required to obtain documents, such as his commitment order and
plea agreement, etc., through means such as writing letters to the
court and contacting his case worker there at the prison.

All of

this took a considerable period of time which rendered virtually
impossible the timely preparation of his Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus.

Also, the Petitioner had no

legal training

whatsoever. When he was transferred to the jurisdiction of another
attorney and had difficulty contacting that attorney, he had no
idea how to complete and file his Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus within the ninety day period.

Petitioner, being an inmate

at the Utah State Prison, was precluded by policy and procedure of
said prison from communicating directly with the co-defendant
Marquez.

Any such communication with said defendant needed to
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occur through the intersession of third parties, which also took a
considerable amount of time.

The ninety days simply was not an

adequate period of time in which the Petitioner could have filed
his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Utah's

ninety

day

statute

of

limitations

is

the

most

restrictive in the nation. Many states do not even have a statute
of limitation on Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Of those

states which do have a statute of limitation on Petitions for Writs
of Habeas Corpus, all of them well exceed ninety days.

Idaho has

a five year statute of limitation on Petitions for Writ of Habeas
Corpus.

Mellinaer vs. State. 740 P.2d 73 (Idaho App. 1987);

Housley vs. State. 811 P.2d 495 (Idaho App. 1991).

Montana has a

five year statute of limitation on Petitions for Writ of Habeas
Corpus. State vs. Perry. 758 P.2d 268 (Mont. 1988).

Colorado has

a three year statute of limitations. People vs. Germany. 674 P.2d
345, 350, (Colo. 1983).

Wyoming has a five year statute of

limitations to bring an action under the post-conviction act. See
Albert vs. State. 466 P.2d 826 (Wyo. 1970).

Illinois has a five

year statute of limitations. See People vs. Beamon. 333 N.E.2d 575
(111.

App. 1975).

limitations.

Mississippi has a three year statute of

Perkins vs. State. 487 So.2d 791 (Miss. 1986).

Patterson vs. Statef 594 So.2d 606 (Miss. 1992). Alabama has a two
year statute of limitations. Dukes vs. State. 587 S.2d
11

1065

(Ala.Cr.App. 1991).

Iowa has a two year statute of limitations on

Petitions for Writs of Habeas Corpus. Davis vs. State, 443 N.W.2d
707 (Iowa 1989).

Other than Utah, the most restrictive statute of

limitations on a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus which the
Petitioner could find is that of 120 days in the State of Oregon.
See Bartz vs. State, 110 Or.App. 613, 825 P.2d 657, (Or. App.
1992).

However, Petitioner is not aware of any Oregon Court

dealing with the reasonableness of the 120 day period because that
was not an issue which has come before it.
Some of the justices in the Utah Supreme Court believe that
the ninety day statute of limitations on a Petition for Writ of
Habeas

Corpus

is

unconstitutional.

In

the

concurring

and

dissenting opinion of Justice Zimmerman in Smith vs. Cook, 803 P.2d
788, 796 (Utah 1990), Justice Zimmerman stated as follows:
W

I concur in the result in part I of the Chief
Justice's opinion, because I do not think the
legislature can validly impose a 3 month
limitation on habeas corpus actions."
See
Utah Constitution Article I Section V(ll); See
also, Condermarin vs. University Hosp.f 775
P.2d 348, 366-69 (Utah 1989), (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring in part); Berry vs. Beech Aircraft
Corp.. 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985).
Justice Stewart, concurred in the concurring and dissenting
opinion of Justice Zimmerman as well.

It is also interesting to

note that Chief Justice Howe who delivered the opinion in Smith vs.
Cook, specifically stated that, "Since we have resolved this issue
12

on statutory grounds, we will not reach Smith's constitutional
arguments".

Smith vs. Cook, at 791.

The Utah Legislature may

impose a limitation on the filing of a Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, but in order for it to be constitutional and not impose on
the Petitioner's protected Due Process rights it must be much more
reasonable than ninety days.

II
THE NINETY DAY STATUTE OF T.TMTTATIONS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
BECAUSE IT IS A STATUTE OF T.TMTTATIONS AND NOT A
PttnrarareAT. T.TMITATION.
In State vs. Fowler, 752 P.2d 497 (Ariz.App. 1987), the
Arizona

Court of Appeals

ruled

that

a one year

statute of

limitations imposed upon the commencement of a post conviction
relief action was unconstitutional because it conflicted with the
Arizona Supreme Court's power to make procedural rules which was
vested in it by the Arizona Constitution. In that case the Arizona
Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically stated that a Petition for
Post Conviction Relief could be filed at any time, however, the
Arizona Legislature passed a statute which stated that any post
conviction relief petition must be filed within a one year period
of time. In Arizona, as in Utah, the State Supreme Court is vested
exclusively with the power to make procedural rules. Id. at 500.
Consequently, any law which the Legislature enacts which infringes
13

upon

the

State

Supreme

Court's

procedural

powers

is

unconstitutional.

1.

To Be Constitutional The Limitation Must Be Procedural In
Nature.

In State vs. Fowler, Id., the court distinguished between a
statute of limitations and a procedural limitation.

The court

pointed out that statute of limitations in the criminal context are
considered acts of grace or a surrendering by the sovereign of its
right to prosecute.

State vs. Fowler, at 500.

The court also

explained that statute of limitations,
M

...create a bar to prosecution and are
therefore not merely statute of repose as they
are in civil cases. A criminal statute of
limitations is not a mere limitation upon the
remedy but one upon the power of the sovereign
to act against the accused."
State vs. Fowler, at 500.
Consequently# as pointed out by the Arizona Court of Appeals
"in criminal law a statute of limitations deals only with the right
to commence a criminal case. Time limits prescribed for steps to
be taken subsequent to the commencement of a case are not statutes
of limitations."

State vs. Fowler, at 500. Such limitations are

procedural in nature and are regulated by the courts, not the
legislature.

14

2.

The Utah Supreme Court Has Imposed No Procedural
Limitation On The Filing Of A Petition For Writ Of Habeas
Corpus,

In Utah# the rules of civil or criminal procedure do not
specifically state a procedural limitation on the filing of a
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus or for Post Conviction Relief.
In Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 65B(b), it states as follows:
(1) Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary
or county jail under a commitment of any court
whether such imprisonment be under an original
commitment or under a commitment for violation
of probation or parole, who asserts that in
any proceedings which resulted in his
commitment there was a substantial denial of
his rights under the Constitution of the
United States or of the State of Utah, or
both, may institute a proceeding under this
rule.
Such proceeding may be commenced by filing a
complaint together with a copy thereof with
the clerk of the court in which such relief is
sought."
The Utah Supreme Court has not placed a procedural limitation
on the filing of the Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus or
Petitions for Post Conviction Relief.
The Utah Constitution specifically states in Article VIII,
Section 4, as follows:
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of
procedure and evidence to be used in the
courts of the state and shall by rule manage
the appellate process.
Thus# if a procedural limitation of ninety days were to be
15

constitutionally imposed upon the filing of the Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus, it would have to be done by the Utah Supreme
Court and not by a Legislative enactment.

Ill
UTAH'S STATUTE OF T.TMTTATIQN IS UNCONSTITDTIONAL
BECAUSE IT CONTAINS NO PROVISION FOR EXCUSABLE DELAY
In order for the Utah ninety day statute of limitations on the
filing of a Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus to be reasonable and
thus, constitutional, it must contain provisions for relief from
being time barred when evidence of excusable delay is presented. In
Passainisi vs. Director, Nevada Department of Prisons, 769 P.2d 72,
74,

(Nev. 1989), the court ruled that the Nevada statute of

limitations was reasonable, "...especially because the requirement
could be waived by showing a prejudice and good cause for failure
to meet the one year time period."

In Albert vs. State. 466 P.2d

826 (Wyo. 1970), where the state has a five year statute of
limitations,

the

court

looked

at

the

issue

of

whether

the

Petitioner's missing of the deadline was due to his own neglect or
excusable delay.

It specifically found no evidence in the record

tending to excuse the delay.

In fact the Wyoming state statute

containing the five year statute of limitations specifically states
that

the petitioner

may

obtain

relief

from

the

statute

of

limitations if he can show facts that indicate that the delay was
16

not due to his own neglect.
In People vs. Germany f

674 P.2d

345, 350

(Colo. 1983),

Colorado held that its statute of limitation for collateral attack
on

criminal

convictions

violated

due

process

by

precluding

challenges to convictions solely on the basis of a time bar without
providing the defendant any opportunity to show justifiable excuse.
In Davis vs. State, 443 N.W.2d 707, 710, the Supreme Court of
Iowa held that imposition of its statute of limitations was also
subject to the right of the Petitioner to raise the issue of
justifiable excuse for delay.

Even in the more restrictive State

of Oregon, the court specifically addresses the issue of whether or
not the Petitioner presented any evidence of his failure to comply
with the 120 day statute of limitations because he was prevented or
dissuaded from examining the issues in the Petitioner's Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

See Bartz vs. State. 110 Or.App. 613,

825 P.2d 657 (Or.App. 1992).
In all of the states researched by Petitioner the petitioner
has the right or the opportunity to raise the issue of whether or
not his failure to comply with the statute of limitations was due
to his own neglect or due to circumstances beyond his control.
Since the Utah statute of

limitations provides

for no such

exception to the filing of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
then it is an unreasonable violation of the Petitioner's Due

17

Process rights and is consequently unconstitutional.
The Petitioner in this case missed the statute of limitations
nor filing his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by only a few
days. The reason for such failure was the fact that the Petitioner
was not able to accumulate his evidence and prepare his Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus within ninety days.

Ninety days was

simply too short a time for the Petitioner to prepare a Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus due to the limited legal resources which
were available to him in the prison.

CONCLUSIONS CONTAINING STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Because the Utah ninety day statute limitations on the filing
of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus or for Post Conviction
Relief is so restrictive in nature it is unconstitutional.

In

order for a restriction on the time period for filing a Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus or Post Conviction Relief to be limited
such limitations must be a procedural limitation imposed by the
Utah Supreme Court which is not the case in Utah. The ninety days
permitted for filing Petitions for Writs of Habeas Corpus and for
Post Conviction Relief by the statute of limitations is much to
restrictive

of period

and

thereby, unconstitutional.

is consecjuently unreasonable, cmd
In order

for

even

a procedural

limitation on the filing of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus or
18

Post Conviction Relief to be constitutional it must have some
provision for excusable delay when the filing deadline has been
missed.
For the above described reasons the Appellant respectfully
request that the court rule that the ninety day statute of
limitation found at Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 is unconstitutional
and thus unenforceable, and to remand the Appellant's case to the
District Court within instructions that Appellant's Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus be heard.
Therefore, the Petitioner respectfully submits that the 90 day
statute of limitations for the filing of a Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus is unreasonable and therefore, unconstitutional and
should be struck down.

DATED this _^x

day of

0

CT

, 1992.

STEPHEN CURRIER
Attorney Pro Se
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

6

day of

1992, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following:

David Bryant
Assistant Attorney General
Department of Corrections
6100 South 300 East
Murray, Utah 84107

C^^^lt***^
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ADDENDUM A

STEPHEN CURRIER
Attorney Pro Se
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT,CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STEPHEN CURRIER,
Petitioner,
vs.

*
*
*
*

PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AND POST
CONVICTION RELIEF

TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden,
Respondent.

*
*

Case No.
Judge

COMES NOW the Petitioner, STEPHEN CURRIER, pursuant to the
following Rule of Civil Procedure:
X

Rule 65B(b) since claim is based on original commitment, or
Rule 65B(b) since claim is based on parole violation, or
Rule 65B(b) since claim is based on probation violation, or
Rule 65B(c) since claim is based on parole grant hearing,

and for cause of action alleges as follows:
1.

Petitioner is being illegally restrained at the following

location: Utah State Prison, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020.
2.

Petitioner was convicted and sentenced at the following

Court: Seventh District Court, Carbon County, State of Utah.
The dates of the proceedings in which the conviction (or Board of
Pardons decision) was entered are as follows: April 3, 198-

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF
The case number for these proceedings is:
and is case number
3.

not known;

X

known

2434.

In plain and concise terms, all of the facts on the basis

of which the Petitioner claims a substantial violation of rights
as the result of the commitment

(or terms of parole) are as

follows:
a.

That

petitioner

had

ineffective

assistance

of

counsel in that petitioner's counsel used undue and wrongful
pressure to have petitioner enter into a plea agreement and plead
guilty to the charges against

the petitioner.

(See P.2 of

Transcripts on Motion to Change Plea) Petitioner's attorney stated
that the plea agreement petitioner was entering into was that the
sentence of one year invoked on petitioner would be suspended, and
that petitioner would receive 1 year unsupervised probation and
that the petitioner could leave the state unsupervised.

Counsel

continued to tell petitioner that this agreement was the best he
could get and that if petitioner went to trial then petitioner was
looking at a term of 1-15 at the Utah State Prison. (See Copies of
Transcripts on Motion To Change Plea).

Petitioner requested

different counsel but his counsel told petitioner that he could not
have another attorney handle his case because there wan one
available to handle his case.

Petitioner told counsel that he

2

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF
could not plead guilty to something he did not do.

However,

counsel kept repeating to petitioner that if he went to trial he
would be sentenced to 1-15 years in prison. Petitioner finally had
no choice but to accept the alleged plea agreement.
b.

Petitioner

had

no

preliminary

hearing.

If

petitioner signed a waiver of preliminary hearing, he did not know
what it was he was signing.
c.

Counsel did not explain it to him.

When the plea was submitted to the judge in open

court the prosecutor said that no plea bargain agreement existed.
d.
plea

bargain,

Because the prosecutor denied the existence of a
petitioner

requested

that

his

guilty

plea

withdrawn approximately two minutes after it was entered.

be
The

Judge refused to allow petitioner to withdraw the guilty plea.
e.

That petitionees counsel had a conflict of interest

in that petitioners counsel also represented Raymond C. Marquez
in the case who made statements against the petitioner that
effected the way the petitioner was defended.

Petitioner was not

aware of the conflict until after he had been sentenced.

As a

result of this conflict, petitioner's counsel was reluctant to try
the case and adequately represent the petitioner.
f.

Because

petitioner

had

no preliminary

hearing,

petitioner's counsel failed to enter evidence of two witnesses'
3
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statements at the preliminary hearing.

Petitioner was accused of

sexual abuse of a child and his counsel did not investigate the
hospital records of the alleged victims as to whether they were
negative or positive until Mr. Currier told him to.
g.

One of the witnesses that had given a statement to

the police that petitioner had sex with both of the victims has now
recanted his statement.

(See Attached Affidavit of Raymond C.

Marquez)
h.

Petitioner is in possession of another affidavit

which states that the alleged victim denied any such assault by
petitioner.
4.

(See Affidavit of Michael Stansfield)

The

judgment

of

conviction

or

the

commitment

for

violation of probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal.
_X_Yes

The number and caption or title of the appellate
proceeding and the results of the review are as follows:
That petitioner's counsel filed an appeal with the Court

of Appeals and then told petitioner to sign an plea agreement to
drop the appeal and not sue anyone including himself, and his
counsel would

get him released

from the Carbon County Jail.

Petitioner signed, the appeal was dismissed and petitioner was
released into probation.
No

He was later violated for dirty urines.

It was not appealed because

4
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Question not applicable since this claim concerns a parole grant
hearing for which there is no appeal or administrative remedy.
5.

The legality of the commitment for violation of probation

or parole or the legality of the parole grant hearing has been
reviewed on appeal.

Yes

X

No

If so, the reasons for the

denial of relief in the prior proceeding are as follows:
N/A

6.

Petitioner requests that he be appointed legal counsel

based on the attached motion and affidavit of impecuniosity.
7.

The

following

documents

are

attached

hereto

and

incorporated herein by reference (check all that apply):
X
_X
X

8.

Affidavits that support Petitioner's allegations
Copies of records that support Petitioner's allegations,
Other evidence that supports Petitioner's allegations
Copies of pleadings, orders and memoranda of the Court
in any other post-conviction or civil proceeding that
adjudicated the legality of Petitioner's commitment
That

pursuant

to URCP

Rules

65B(b)(12) and

54(d),

Petitioner requests that this Court order the Respondent to obtain
such transcripts of proceedings or court records which are relevant
and material to this case and requests that the county in which he
was originally
proceeding.

charged be directed to pay the costs of the

(See attached motion and affidavit of impecuniosity).
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9.

Due to the continuing nature of the illegal restraint,

the statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. §78-12-31.1
does not bar this action.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court:
1.

Schedule an evidentiary hearing at which time Petitioner

may be present and represented by counsel.
2.

Permit Petitioner, who remains indigent, to proceed

without prepayment of costs, fees or other assessments.
3.

Grant Petitioner the authority to obtain subpoenas in

Forma Pauperis, for witnesses and documents necessary to assist in
the proof of the facts alleged in the petition as stated above.
4.

Issue an Order for Post Conviction Relief to have the

Petitioner brought before it, to the end that he may be discharged
from the illegal and unconstitutional confinement and restraint.
Dated this

day of

, 1992.

STEPHEN CURRIER
Attorney Pro Se

6
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FILE COP!
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
DAVID F. BRYANT (5672)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
300 East 6100 South, Suite 204
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 265-5638

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STEPHEN CURRIER,
MOTION TO DISMISS
Petitioner,
v.
TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden,

Case No.

Respondent.

92-85

Judge Boyd Bunnell

Respondent, by and through her counsel, David F. Bryant,
Assistant Attorney General, hereby moves this court to dismiss
Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus because it is timebarred and raises claims which could and should have been raised on
appeal.

.
DATED this

^ay of April, 1992.

DAVID F. BRYANT
Assistant Attorney ^General

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the £%>

day of April, 1992, I

caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing to
Stephen Currier, pro se, P.O.Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020.

tf*~f
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AnnENDUM C

STEPHEN CURRIER
Attorney Pro Se
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT, CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STEPHEN CURRIER
PETITIONER

OBJECTION

vs.

Case No. 92-95
TAMARA HOLDEN, WARDEN
RESPONDENT

Judge Boyd Bunnell

Petitioner, Stephen Currier, Attorney Pro Se, hereinafter known as petitioner, with his objection,
to respondents' "Motion to Dismiss," and states as follows:

4>

1. Petitioner does have cognizable issues;
2. In the interest of justice, petitioner believes that in this instant case, that, "Pro Se Habeas
t> Corpus petitions should be liberally construed," as stated in, Wallace vs. Lockhart. 701 F.2d. 719 (8th Cir.
*
,5ro
1982);

\n

w

/

.4

\

3. Petitioner's petition should not be dismissed, as a dismissal is contrary to Utah Constitution,
Article I, Section II, of which Utah Code Annotated, 78*12-31.1, attempts to supercede, which cannot
Stand, as can be seen in, Micheal O. Smith vs. Gerald Cook. Warden. Utah Stats Prison: David R
Wilkinson. Utah State Attorney General. Case No. 890241, filed November 29th, 1990, In THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH; of which also provides more than sufficient caselaw in
support of the ruling.

4. In further support to continue this action, to present for a hearing, to determine the facts, a bar ^ ^ *i;au*
to dismissal is supported again, in the Utah Constitution, under Article I, Section 5,^which simultaneously ^
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65B (bl. gives further, and original jurisdiction, not to / */
suspend the privilege of Writ of Habeas Corpus..., in the instant c a s ^ — *a< n*+~\ ^ U * A _ oMi^A- <-r ,
5. This court is bound under Article I, Section 3, of the Utah Constitution, in combination with
%
^ Article VI, Section 2 of the United States Constitution.
/
6. Further, this court is bound by Article I, Section 9 (2), United States Constitution, whereby,
^ T h e privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended...," which supercedes Utah Code
n
Ann. 78-12-31.1, that David F. Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Utah, should be well
aware of.
^ , *
7. Petitioner further claims protection, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution,
0^\
In the interest of justice, in barring Respondents' Motion to Dismiss.
jjc ***)
r
8. Under, Bounds vs. Smith. 97 S. Ct, at 1491, "Prisoners have the constitutionalrightof access
r
to the courts.", and even if Utah Code Annotated, Statute 78-12-31.1, is not superceded, Petitioner is
\ r ^
c
being incarcerated on an ongoing basis, and it would be a travesty of justice to make an innocent man ^
^\^V^h
continue to be incarcerated because of the technicality of a (90) ninety day statute of limitations.* """ ^^^^J- * ^
9. Petitioner has been transferred, repeatedly, from one facility to another, making It impossible °^\^^
^
to file within the time frame, which is supported by an affidavit from Wayne A. Freestone, Contract i
\j*^ ^
Attorney, for the Department of Corrections, attached and incorporated with this objection.
^ ^
\~S
"*^
10. Addressing the second point, in Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, in their memorandum, \j^ *~
Petitioners' Attorney did not file an interlocutory appeal and then advised Petitioner to dismiss the appeal. \ J L v****^
11. The dismissal, supra "10", was offered, under the Attorneys' advice as deal to get out of jail, £ J L $ **°^
under the provision that an agreement was signed.
*
12. The agreement, supra "11" was not to sue anyone, including the lawyer himself, and to
dismiss the appeal.
13.Petitioners' Attorney was unethically involved with a conflict of interest in coercing Petitioner to
sign the above mentioned agreement, as the lawyer was personally involved in protecting himself from
being sued.

y

In the interest of justice, this court should investigate the circumstances of this instant action,
take Petitioners' allegations as true, hold a hearing to determine the facts, and determine whether the
plea bargain is valid-given to the entirety of circumstances, and also insure the protection of Petitioners'
Constitutional Rights, under state and federal laws of this land.
jj

Dated this Z

day of fT*hrC

f

Stephen Currier

-p-

1992

I, Stephen Currier, Pro Se, Petitioner, hereby certify that on <5?
day of.
1992,1 caused to be mailed, a true and correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION, to:
Clerk of the Court-Carbon County
149 East 100 South
Price, Utah 84501

R. Paul Van Dam (3312)
Attoyney General
David F. Bryant (5672)
Assistant Attorney General
State of Utah
Attorneys' for Respondent
300 East 6100 Soutrh, Suite 204
Murray, Utah 84107

Stephen Currier, Pro Se,
Petitioner

ADDENDUM D

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR CARB
STATE OF UTAH

RULING ON RESPOND]
MOTION TO DISMISS

STEPHEN CURRIER*
Petitioner*

TAMARA HOLD EN, Warden*
Civil No. 92-85

Respondent.

The Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss this Petition on
the ground that it was not timely filed in accordance with Section
78-12-31.1 of the Utah Code. The Plaintiff has objected to the Motion
and has requested oral arguments.
From the file and the memorandum submitted* the Court finds
that the Petition was not timely filed as required by the Rule* and
that the Rule setting a time limitation on the filing of applications
for writs of habeas corpus does not suspend the right under the
Constitution* and that the Statute of Limitations as specified is not
unconstitutional.
The Court Further finds that the constitutional issue has been
authoritatively analyzed and ruled upon and therefore* the Court will
deny the application for oral arguments.
THE COURT HEREBY grants the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the Petition was not timely filed* and directs that the attorney for the
Respondent prepare a formal order to that effect.
DATED this /2.

day of June, 1992 . ^ O ^

^

_
/

//)/7sn
/

—BOTD.^JDNNEEt, "Districi-Jtjage

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I Mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing

RULING ON RESPONDENTS MOTION TO DISMISS

by depositing

the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:

David F. Bryant
Assistant Attorney General
300 East 6100 South, Suite 204
Murray UT
84107
Stephen Currier
UTAH STATE PRISON
Post Office Box 250
Draper UT
84020

DATED this /iL

day of June, 1992

Secretary

ADDENDUM E

injunction may cause the party restrained or enjoined;
(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would not
be adverse to the public interest; and
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the
applicant will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues on
the merits which should be the subject of further
litigation.
(0 Domestic relations cases.
Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the
uitable powers of the courts in domestic relations
ses.
mended effective September 1, 1991.)
de 65B. Extraordinary relief.
a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain,
3edy and adequate remedy is available, a person
ly petition the court for extraordinary relief on any
the grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving
ongful imprisonment), paragraph (c) (involving
ler types of wrongful restraint on personal liberty),
ragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of public or
-porate authority) or paragraph (e) (involving the
ongful use of judicial authority and the failure to
grcise such authority). There shall be no special
m of writ The procedures in this rule shall govern
>ceedings on all petitions for extraordinary relief.
the extent that this rule does not provide special
>cedures, proceedings on petitions for extraordiry relief shall be governed by the procedures set
th elsewhere in these rules.
b) Wrongful imprisonment.
(1) Scope. Any person committed by a court to
imprisonment in a state prison, other correctional facility or county jail who asserts that the
commitment resulted from a substantial denial
of rights may petition the court for relief under
this paragraph. This paragraph (b) shall govern
proceedings based on claims relating to original
commitments and commitments for violation of
probation or parole. This paragraph (b) shall not
govern proceedings based on claims relating to
the terms or conditions of confinement.
(2) Commencement. The proceeding shall be
commenced by filing a petition, together with a
copy thereof, with the clerk of the court in which
the commitment leading to confinement was issued, except that the court may order a change of
venue on motion of a party for the convenience of
the parties or witnesses.
(3) Contents of the petition. The petition
shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has
in relation to the legality of the commitment. Additional claims relating to the legality of the
commitment may not be raised in subsequent
proceedings except for good cause shown. The petition shall state:

probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and caption or
title of the appellate proceeding and the results of the review;
(v) whether the legality of the commitment has already been adjudicated in any
prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and if so the reasons for the denial of
relief in the prior proceeding.
(4) Attachments to the petition. The petitioner shall attach to the petition affidavits, copies of records or other evidence available to the
petitioner in support of the allegations. The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a copy of
the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior
post-conviction or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the commitment, and a
copy of all orders and memoranda of the court. If
copies of pertinent pleadings, orders, and memoranda are not attached, the petition shall state
why they are not attached.
(5) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or
discuss authorities in the petition, but these may
be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies
of which shall be filed with the petition.
(6) Assignment by the presiding judge. On
the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly
deliver it to the presiding judge of the court in
which it is filed. The presiding judge shall if possible assign the proceeding to the judge who issued the commitment.
(7) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review
of the petition, if it is apparent to the court that
the issues presented in the petition have already
been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for
any other reason any claim in the petition shall
appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating
that the claim is frivolous on its face. The order
shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry
of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal
need not recite findings of fact or conclusions of
law.
(8) Service of petitions. If, on review of the
petition, the court concludes that all or part of
the petition is not frivolous on its face, the court
shall designate the portions of the petition that
are not frivolous and direct the clerk to serve a
copy of the petition and a copy of any memorandum by mail upon the attorney general and the
county attorney.
(9) Responsive pleading. Within twenty
days (plus time allowed under these rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition
upon the attorney general and county attorney,
or within such other period of time as the court

ADDENDUM F

tiall have the effect of removing a justice from office.
„ chief justice shall be selected from among the jusces of the Supreme Court as provided by statute,
he chief justice may resign as chief justice without
^signing from the Supreme Court. The Supreme
ourt by rule may sit and render final judgment eiler er banc or in divisions. The court shall not delare any law unconstitutional under this constituon or the Constitution of the United States, except
Q the concurrence of a majority of all justices of the
upreme Court. If a justice of the Supreme Court is
isqualified or otherwise unable to participate in a
ause before the court, the chief justice, or in the
vent the chief justice is disqualified or unable to parcipate, the remaining justices, shall call an active
idge from an appellate court or the district court to
articipate in the cause.
1984

ec. 3. [Jurisdiction of Supreme Court]
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction
) issue all extraordinary writs and to answer quesons of state law certified by a court of the United
tates. The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisiction over all other matters to be exercised as proided by statute, and power to issue all writs and
rders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme
lourt's jurisdiction or the complete determination of
ny cause.
1984
lee. 4.

[Rule-making power of Supreme Court
— J u d g e s pro tempore — Regulation
of practice of law.]
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure
nd evidence to be used in the courts of the state and
hall by rule manage the appellate process. The Legslature may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evience adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of
wo-thirds of all members of both houses of the Legisature. Except as otherwise provided by this constituion, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize reired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to
erform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall
e citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and
dmitted to practice law in Utah. The Supreme Court
y rule shall govern the practice of law, including
dmission to practice law and the conduct and discidine of persons admitted to practice law.
1984
5ec. 5.

[Jurisdiction of district court and other
courts — Right of appeal.]
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in
11 matters except as limited by this constitution or
>y statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs.
Tie district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as
irovided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other
ourts, both original and appellate, shall be provided
>y statute. Except for matters filed originally with
he Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an
ippeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction

Sec. 7. [Qualifications of justices and judges.]
Supreme Court justices shall be at least 30 years
old, United States citizens, Utah residents for five
years preceding selection, and admitted to practice
law in Utah. Judges of other courts of record shall be
at least 25 years old, United States citizens, Utah
residents for three years preceding selection, and admitted to practice law in Utah. If geographic divisions are provided for any court, judges of that court
shall reside in the geographic division for which they
are selected.
1984
Sec. 8. [Vacancies — Nominating commissions
— Senate approval.]
When a vacancy occurs in a court of record, the
governor shall fill the vacancy by appointment from a
list of at least three nominees certified to the governor by the Judicial Nominating Commission having
authority over the vacancy. The governor shall fill
the vacancy within 30 days after receiving the list of
nominees. If the governor fails to fill the vacancy
within the time prescribed, the chief justice of the
Supreme Court shall within 20 days make the appointment from the list of nominees. The Legislature
by statute shall provide for the nominating commissions' composition and procedures. No member of the
Legislature may serve as a member of, nor may the
Legislature appoint members to, any Judicial Nominating Commission. The Senate shall consider and
render a decision on each judicial appointment within
30 days of the date of appointment. If necessary, the
Senate shall convene itself in extraordinary session
for the purpose of considering judicial appointments.
The appointment shall be effective upon approval of a
majority of all members of the Senate. If the Senate
fails to approve the appointment, the office shall be
considered vacant and a new nominating process
shall commence. Selection of judges shall be based
solely upon consideration of fitness for office without
regard to any partisan political considerations. 1984
[Vacancies — Nominating commissions — Senate approval.] [Proposed.]
(1) When a vacancy occurs in a court of record, the
governor shall fill the vacancy by appointment from a
list of at least three nominees certified to the governor by the Judicial Nominating Commission having
authority over the vacancy. The governor shall fill
the vacancy within 30 days after receiving the list of
nominees. If the governor fails to fill the vacancy^
within the time prescribed, the chief justice of the
Supreme Court shall within 20 days make the appointment from the list of nominees.
(2) The Legislature by statute shall provide for the
nominating commissions' composition and procedures. No member of the Legislature may serve as a
member of, nor may the Legislature appoint members
to, any Judicial Nominating Commission.
(3) The Senate shall consider and render a decision

ADDENDUM G

dertakmg in a criminal action, tor a torleiture or
penalty to the state.
(4) An action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or seduction.
(5) An action against a sheriff or other officer
for the escape of a prisoner arrested or imprisoned upon either civil or criminal process.
(6) An action against a municipal corporation
for damages or injuries to property caused by a
mob or riot.
(7) A claim for relief or a cause of action under
the following sections of Title 25, Chapter 6, the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the time for action to
four years, under Section 25-6-10; or
(b) Subsection 25-6-6(2).

1989

12-30. Actions on claims against county, city
or town.
Actions on claims against a county, city or incorpoed town, which have been rejected by the board of
mty commissioners, city commissioners, city counor board of trustees, as the case may be, must be
imenced within one year after the first rejection
reof by such board of county or city commisners. city council or board of trustees.
1953

12-31. Within six months.
Vithin six months:
Ln action against an officer, or an officer de facto:
(1) to recover any goods, wares, merchandise
or other property seized by any such officer in his
official capacity as tax collector, or to recover the
price or value of any goods, wares, merchandise
or other personal property so seized, or for damages for the seizure, detention, sale of, or injury
to, any goods, wares, merchandise or other personal property seized, or for damages done to any
person or property in making any such seizure.
(2) for money paid to any such officer under
protest, or seized by such officer in his official
capacity, as a collector of taxes, and which, it is
claimed, ought to be refunded.
1953

12-31.1. Habeas corpus — Three months.
Vithin three months:
For relief pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus.
This limitation shall apply not only as to grounds
known to petitioner but also to grounds which in
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
been known by petitioner or counsel for petitioner.
1979

12-31.2. Post-conviction remedies — 30 days.
Mhin 30 days:
No post-conviction remedies may be applied for
or entertained by any court within 30 days prior
to the date set for execution of a capital sentence,
unless the grounds therefor are based on facts or

The limitations in this article apply to actions
brought in the name of or for the benefit of the state
or other governmental entity, the same as to actions
by private parties, except under Section 78-12-33.5.
1988

78-12-33.5. Statute of limitations — Asbestos
damages — Action by state or governmental entity.
(1) (a) No statute of limitations or repose may bar
an action by the state or other governmental entity to recover damages from any manufacturer
of any construction materials containing asbestos, when the action arises out of the manufacturer's providing the materials, directly or
though other persons, to the state or other governmental entity or to a contractor on behalf of
the state or other governmental entity.
(b) Subsection (a) provides for actions not yet
barred, and also acts retroactively to permit actions under this section that are otherwise
barred.
(2) As used in this section, "asbestos" means
asbestiform varieties of:
(a) chrysotile (serpentine);
(b) crocidolite (riebeckite);
(c) amosite (cummingtonite-grunerite);
(d) anthophyllite;
(e) tremolite; or
(f) actinolite.
78-12-34.

1988

Repealed.

1981

ARTICLE 3
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
78-12-35. Effect of absence from state.
Where a cause of action accrues against a person
when he is out of the state, the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter
after his return to the state. If after a cause of action
accrues he departs from the state, the time of his
absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.
1987
78-12-36. Effect of disability.
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than
for the recovery of real property, is at the time the
cause of action accrued, either under the age of majority or mentally incompetent and without a legal
guardian, the time of the disability is not a part of the
time limited for the commencement of the action.
1987

78-12-37. Effect of death.
If a person entitled to bring an action dies before
the expiration of the time limited for the commencement thereof, and the cause of action survives, an
action may be commenced by his representatives after the expiration of that time and within one year

